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CHARITY, DECOLONIZATION AND
DEVELOPMENT: THE CASE OF THE
STAREHE BOYS SCHOOL, NAIROBI*
5The Starehe Boys School in Nairobi is one of the undoubted
success stories of post-independence Kenya. It was founded in
1959 by Geoffrey Griffin, a disillusioned former British army
officer. Appalled by the atrocities committed by both sides
during the Mau Mau Emergency (1952–60), Griffin refused to
10renew his commission and worked instead to care for juveniles
caught up in the crisis. Initially with just two tin sheds on a piece of
waste ground not far from the slums in the Eastlands district of
the city, the school began as a club which took in destitute boys
made homeless either through the death of their parents or their
15forced migration.
Griffin conceived of Starehe as a home and an escape for the
boys from their often dreadful circumstances (starehe means
‘peace’ or ‘comfort’ in Swahili). With support from a range of
financial backers, Griffin’s plans became more ambitious. After
20independence at the end of 1963, his ‘club’ soon became an
officially recognized school and by the early 1970s was
achieving some of the best examination results in the country at
both primary and secondary level. Today, with the boys easily
recognised in their familiar red and blue uniforms, often seen
25parading in their famous brass band, the school is persistently
put forward as a triumphant display of what an independent
Kenya can and has achieved. Through its myriad supporters
and donors all around the world, the school continues to take in
the poor and disadvantaged and provides them with a free
30education alongside a small (up to 20 per cent of the total
school population) — if massively over-subscribed — cohort of
fee-paying students.1
* I am extremely grateful for the advice, comments and assistance of the following:
David Anderson, Emily Baughan, Dan Branch, Matt Houlbrook, Andrew Jones, John
Lonsdale, Tom McCaskie, Anthony Mwangi, Saima Nasar, Paul Ocobock, Kevin
O’Sullivan, Benedetta Rossi, Stephen Smith and Heather Widdows
1 The first and most significant history of the school was written by a former
volunteer teacher: Roger Martin, Anthem of Bugles: The Story of Starehe Boys’ Centre
Past and Present, no. 00 (August 2016) The Past and Present Society, Oxford, 2016
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This article seeks to explore why the school became the object
of the hopes and imaginations of a really quite extraordinary cast
of characters. As will be seen, Griffin himself is perhaps the
most intriguing individual bound up with Starehe’s history.
5But he was joined at various points by so many who,
collectively, demonstrate the competing — though more often
complementary — interests that have been invested in the
broader project of development in Africa. Griffin’s chief
administrative support came from Pat Shaw, in his spare time
10possibly the most brutal police officer in Kenya’s recent history.
Together, they received at the school hundreds of prominent
visitors and admirers over the years, ranging from politicians
such as Jomo Kenyatta, Daniel arap Moi, Mwai Kibaki and
Mau Mau resistance leader Tom Mboya, Waruhiu Itote
15(‘General China’), film-maker Ken Loach, royalty such as
Britain’s Princess Anne, King Constantine of Greece and
Queen Beatrix of the Netherlands, international political
heavyweights like Indira Ghandi, Senator Robert Kennedy and
Desmond Tutu, sports personalities as prominent as Muhammad
20Ali and Pele, popular entertainers such as Vera Lynn and Cliff
Richard, and the British children’s television presenter Valerie
Singleton, of Blue Peter.
For all these individuals, Starehe became a symbol for
something much more significant. It stood in for the future of a
25country, if not a continent. For Griffin it was a means by which he
could offer his services to his fellow Kenyans after the Emergency,
a means more in keeping with the ill-fated liberal rehabilitative
principles that supposedly lay behind the notorious detention
camps set up for the Mau Mau. For the moderate nationalists
30who took control of the country at independence it represented
what Kenyatta termed harambee, Kenya’s own ‘self help’ process
of national development. For others it constituted a traditional
form of charitable assistance, while for others still it was an
example of development for all of Africa to follow. Only for Ken
35Loach, the one critic from those listed above, did it represent the
inappropriate transfer of the English public school ethos to the
(n. 1 cont.)
and School (Nairobi, 1978). Various other publications have appeared, often timed to
coincide with important school anniversaries. See, for example, Kennedy O. A. Hongo
and J. N. K. Mugambi, Starehe Boys’ Centre, School and Institute: The First Forty Years,
1959–1999 (Nairobi, 2000),
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African context. Yet for all the others, it was to serve as a classic
instance of what has been somewhat pejoratively labelled a ‘donor
darling’, the sheer amount of international funds being the key
factor behind its growth and success.
5This article takes the admittedly peculiar example of just one
school to cast light on wider processes in the history of charity,
decolonization and development. Starehe became an instance of
what has otherwise been referred to as the ‘projection of personal
ideologies onto a space on the map sufficiently little-known as to
10accommodate fantasies of every type’.2 As a consequence, the
school has been able to thrive. It has come to have a special
place in Kenyan society, its achievements as a ‘bastion of
excellence’ perpetually being reported in the press.3 Griffin
himself was honoured several times by the Kenyan and British
15governments and frequent official reports have commended the
school’s disciplinary, educational and social service record.4 All
this was possible because, unlike other aid initiatives, Starehe has
been able to attract the consistent support, over several decades,
of international charities, official aid agencies, the UK and other
20western governments and the Kenyan ruling class. Griffin proved
to be an adept master at making all of these potentially conflicting
interests and agendas serve the purpose of his beloved school.
Thanks to the opening up of new archives, principally the
unofficial British agencies of Oxfam, the Save the Children
25Fund (hereafter SCF) and Christian Aid, which constituted
some of Starehe’s main international donors, it is possible to
2 Stephen Ellis, Season of Rains: Africa in the World (London, 2011), 94.
3 ‘Starehe’s bastion of excellence’, Weekly Review, 13 Oct 1989, 20–1. Further such
press cuttings can be found in the Kenya National Archives, Nairobi (hereafter KNA),
XK/1/12, ‘Starehe’.
4 Kenyatta awarded Griffin the Moran of the Burning Spear in 1970, Moi the Order
of the Golden Heart in 1986 and he was appointed OBE by the British government in
2002: Peter Otiato Ojiambo, Teaching beyond Teaching: Dr. Geoffrey William Griffin and
Starehe Boys Centre and School (Saarbru¨cken, 2008); ‘Geoffrey W. Griffin: Obituary’,
Old Cambrian Society, 2005, at5http://www.oldcambrians.com/Obituary-Grif
fin,Geoffrey.html4(accessed 19 Jan. 2015); Peter Ngangi Nguli, ‘Dr Geoffrey
Griffin a Man who Had a Heart for Black Children in Need’, Standard Media, 21
Aug. 2013, at5http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000091464/dr-geoffrey-
griffin-a-man-who-had-a-heart-for-black-children-in-need?articleID¼2000091464
&story_title¼dr-geoffrey-griffin-a-man-who-had-a-heart-for-black-children-in-nee
d&pageNo¼24(accessed 19 Jan. 2015); ‘Geoffrey Griffin: obituary’, The Times, 18
Aug 2005, at5http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/opinion/obituaries/article2084245.ece
(accessed 19 Jan. 2015); Report of the National Committee on Educational Objectives and
Policies (Nairobi, 1976), 35.
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trace how and why Starehe appealed to so many. Moreover, in
situating such sources alongside those produced by the school
itself, and with newspapers and official papers available in the
UK and Kenya National Archives, it is possible to offer a case
5study of development that follows a literature on decolonization
in approaching the subject from the three-sided perspective of the
global context, the national donors of the former colonial powers
and the socio-political pressures within the recipient state.5 The
first part of this essay therefore traces the appeal of Starehe to
10donors in Britain and elsewhere, especially for rapidly expanding
charities and NGOs becoming increasingly associated with the
global development infrastructure. The second part turns its
attention to Kenya itself, drawing out how the appeal of the
school to certain political agendas and national priorities
15complemented the desire of the donor community to provide a
model for African development.
In recent years, scholars have increasingly turned their
attention to the history of humanitarianism. In part this is a
reaction to our present-day concerns about the ways in which
20seemingly straightforward feelings for the welfare of distant
others is interconnected with wider political issues about
human rights, global governance and international security.6
Humanitarian histories, covering topics as broad as anti-slavery
activism, refugee assistance, disaster relief and longer-term aid
25interventions, uncover patterns of empathy, solidarity and fellow
feeling that run counter to the real and imagined boundaries
created by global geopolitical rivalries, either of an imperial or
Cold War nature. This case study of Starehe makes a
contribution to this literature by connecting it with the three
30key issues of decolonization, development and charity.
First, as a school set up under a late-colonial regime and
which flourished under an independent one, Starehe represents
a key example of an institution which eased the processes
of decolonization by providing important continuities of
5 John Darwin, Britain and Decolonization: The Retreat from Empire in the Postwar
World (Basingstoke, 1988); Martin Shipway, Decolonization and its Impact: A
Comparative Approach to the End of Colonial Empires (Oxford, 2008); W. David
McIntyre, British Decolonization, 1946–1997: When, Why and How did the British
Empire Fall? (Basingstoke, 1998).
6 Stefan Ludwig-Hoffman, ‘Human Rights and History’, Past and Present, no. 232
(Aug. 2016).
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personnel, ideas and practices.7 Expertise residing in institutions
did not just disappear. In the realms of social welfare as much as
economics, ways of thinking and seeing formed the continuous
foundations above which political change took place.8 Because of
5this, key dates in the apparent transformation of humanitarianism
such as the end of the Second World War, become less important
than the permanencies in personnel and practices throughout the
middle decades of the twentieth century. In countries such as
Kenya, individuals navigated their way through the late-colonial
10state and on into the post-colonial regime. Characters such as
Griffin were able to stay because they worked for both national
and international agents, thereby ensuring that initiatives such as
Starehe appealed both to the new regime and to supporters within
the former colonial powers.9
15Second, these continuities not only mattered for newly
empowered Kenyan officials and politicians, but for
international agencies keen to utilize the contacts that they had
made during imperialism to support further development
initiatives. These interpretations of decolonization are easy to
20reconcile with a literature on development. The late-colonial
state engaged in a heightened policy of ‘developmentalism’ that
constituted a ‘second colonial occupation’ of centralized
planning and technological progress.10 The expert personnel
and the faith in rational planning were shared not only among
25colonial officials and moderate nationalist planners, but also by
7 Frederick Cooper, Africa Since 1940: The Past of the Present (Cambridge, 2002);
Frederick Cooper and Randall Packard, ‘Introduction’, in Frederick Cooper and
Randall Packard (eds.), International Development and the Social Sciences: Essays on
the History and Politics of Knowledge (Berkeley, 1997); Frederick Cooper, Colonialism
in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History (Berkeley, 2005).
8 Joseph Morgan Hodge, Triumph of the Expert: Agrarian Doctrines of Development
and the Legacies of British Colonialism (Athens, Oh., 2007); William Beinart, Karen
Brown and Daniel Gilfoyle, ‘Experts and Expertise in Colonial Africa Reconsidered:
Science and the Interpenetration of Knowledge’, African Affairs, cviii (2009);
Timothy Mitchell, Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity (Berkeley, Ca.,
2002).
9 Andrew Burton and Michael Jennnings, ‘Introduction: The Emperor’s New
Clothes? Continuities in Governance in Late Colonial and Early Postcolonial East
Africa’, International Journal of African Historical Studies, xl (2007); Crawford Young,
The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective (New Haven, Ct., 1994).
10 D. A. Low and J. M. Lonsdale, ‘Introduction: Towards the New Order, 1945–
63’, in D. A. Low and Alison Smith (eds.), History of East Africa, iii (Oxford, 1976);
Joanna Lewis, Empire State-Building: War and Welfare in Kenya, 1925–52 (Oxford,
2000).
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the expanding bureaucracy of a global development
infrastructure. Technical assistance often relied on the
knowledge and actual experience of colonial officials, especially
when the final stages of decolonization meant that many —
5Griffin included — sought alternative sources of employment.11
The point that the case of Starehe demonstrates, though, is that
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) also played an
important role in the interconnected histories of decolonization
and development. Starehe’s formative decade — the 1960s —
10came at the same time as the UN’s first development decade
when the international aid system was being both reimagined
and reinforced. Bodies such as the UN Food and Agriculture
Organization (hereafter FAO) became concerned not only with
prestige economic and technical infrastructure projects but also
15with meeting the needs of the hungriest people. Reaching the
poorest meant that the FAO worked in partnership with NGOs
on the ground which, in turn, continued to support local welfare
and missionary bodies that had operated at the frontline of
grassroots social services for many decades previously.12 Of
20greatest significance was the Freedom From Hunger
Campaign, launched by the FAO in 1960. The Campaign
transformed the humanitarian and development sector,
enrolling NGOs into the FAO projects and wider machinery
while also massively boosting their incomes and forcing a shift
25in their roles from agencies concerned with immediate relief and
suffering into ones focused on long-term development.13
11 Gilbert Rist, The History of Development: From Western Origins to Global Faith,
trans. Patrick Camiller (London, 2008); Marc Frey and So¨nke Kunkel, ‘Writing the
History of Development: A Review of the Recent Literature’, Contemporary European
History, xx (2011); Frederick Cooper, ‘Writing the History of Development’, Journal
of Modern European History, viii (2010).
12 Such continuities call into question the sense of the modern aid and humanitarian
sector as a specifically post-1945 development: Rob Skinner and Alan Lester,
‘Humanitarianism and Empire: New Research Agendas’, Journal of Imperial and
Commonwealth History, xl (2012); Michael N. Barnett, Empire of Humanity: A
History of Humanitarianism (Ithaca, NY, 2011); Johannes Paulmann, ‘Conjunctures
in the History of International Humanitarian Aid during the Twentieth Century’,
Humanity, iv (2013); Daniel Maul, Human Rights, Development and Decolonization:
The International Labour Organization, 1940–1970 (Basingstoke, 2012).
13 Peter Gattrell, Free World? The Campaign to save the World’s Refugees, 1956–1963
(Cambridge, 2011); Maggie Black, A Cause for our Times: Oxfam, the First Fifty Years
(Oxford, 1992), 74; Anna Bocking-Welch, ‘Imperial Legacies and Internationalist
Discourses: British Involvement in the United Nations Freedom from Hunger
Campaign, 1960–70’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, xl (2012).
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Starehe’s early history came at a time when western donor
agencies were transforming their roles into something more
familiar to today’s, often big, international NGOs.
Third, the story of Starehe is also one of what charity has
5achieved in the history of development, especially at a time
when new independent governments had scarce resources for
social welfare projects. NGOs raced into Africa and elsewhere
with little knowledge and very little experience, but they did so
backed by increasingly significant funds from a generous public
10eager to see its money spent on projects that testified to the good
effects of their charitable donations. Starehe would prove to be
such a grassroots project and one whichappealed to the public in
Britain and elsewhere. Whether it was in the long-term interests
of the Kenyan people was not an issue which yet concerned the
15expanding NGOs. Enthusiasm trumped expertise in these
optimistic early years of what would eventually come to be
termed the ‘alternative’ path to development.14 It resulted in a
scatter-gun approach to small-scale local development projects
that both lacked cohesion and facilitated the continuation of
20colonial institutions and systems of knowledge. Older forms of
mission and, as with Griffin, ex-pat civil servants proved
particularly adept at securing funds from British charities. As
will be seen from a focus on Starehe’s two principal early
backers, the Save the Children Fund and Oxfam, the turn to
25development, although well meaning and potentially effective,
was also un-coordinated and largely unaccountable. Starehe’s
story is therefore also one about how aid has worked on the
ground, with all the success and failures that this has entailed
for NGO involvement in the international aid business.15
30That Starehe is able to bear the weight of such an analysis, is in
large part due to the multifaceted career of Griffin himself. He
simultaneously held three positions. In the first place, he was a
charitable volunteer. Starehe was always his own private
14 Michael Edwards and David Hulme (eds.), Making a Difference: NGOs and
Development in a Changing World (London, 1992); Terje Tvedt, Angels of Mercy or
Development Diplomats? NGOs and Aid (Oxford, 1998); David Lewis and Tina
Wallace (eds.), New Roles and Relevance: Development NGOs and the Challenge of
Change (West Hartford, Ct., 2000); Anthony J. Bebbington, Samuel Hickey and
Diana C. Mitlin (eds.), Can NGOs Make a Difference? The Challenge of Development
Alternatives (London, 2008).
15 Gregory Mann, From Empires to NGOs in the West African Sahel: The Road to
Nongovernmentality (Cambridge, 2015).
7 of 41CHARITY, DECOLONIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT
[25.8.2016–9:22am] [1–42] Paper: OP-PAST160043
MANUSCRIPT CATEGORY: ARTICLE
initiative, supported by the unpaid work that he put in as director
after he had finished his day job and which continued to his death
in 2005. In that sense he was a recipient of aid, though one who
was able to exploit the opportunities available such that his
5biographer referred to him as ‘Kenya’s champion beggar’.16
Secondly, though, he was also a career civil servant during
decolonization and beyond. He served as Colony Youth Officer
in the last years of British rule and was then immediately
appointed by Kenyatta to run the new National Youth Service.
10This gave him superb contacts across several administrations and
his work there makes clear just how important youth policy was to
both the colonial and post-colonial state. Finally, Griffin worked
in an honorary capacity as the administrator for SCF in Kenya,
thus connecting him to the world of international development.
15This ensured that he was always able to make Starehe the chief
focus of activity for SCF in Kenya, as well as opening a door to
various sources of funding that existed more generally across
Europe and North America. As will be seen, the real reasons for
Starehe’s success are due to Griffin’s navigation of these three
20roles — recipient, administrator, donor — which mapped onto
the three broader historical processes emphasised below —
charity, decolonization, development — and always to the
advantage of the institution closest to his heart. But that he was
able to do so points to more significant interconnections between
25colonial and post-colonial states, donor publics and charities, and
the wider structures that supported international development
practices in the key early years of decolonization.
I
Starehe’s founder was an idiosyncratic, if highly motivated, settler
30colonial. The son of a police officer, George William Griffin was
born in 1933 in Eldoret in the settler community of Kenya’s
Highlands. As a boy he attended the main educational
establishment for Europeans in Nairobi, the Prince of Wales
School, two years ahead of his own age group. There he
35experienced bullying though he later flourished after he edited
the school newsletter and revived the school scout troop, two
16 Yusuf M. King’ala, The Autobiography of G. W. Griffin, Kenya’s Champion Beggar,
as Narrated by Himself to Yusuf M. King’ala (Nairobi, 2005).
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enthusiasms which would shape the expansion of Starehe.
Knowing that his parents would not be able to fund a university
education, he dropped out of the sixth form and joined the Survey
of Kenya as a junior cadet. When the State of Emergency was
5declared in 1952 he undertook officer training in the UK and was
commissioned as Second Lieutenant in the King’s Royal Rifle
Corps. Because he was fluent in Swahili, he served as an
Intelligence Officer in the 3rd Battalion of the Kings Africa
Rifles.17
10Griffin’s military career was short but it had a profound effect
on his outlook. He claimed to have been ‘awestruck by the sheer
brutality’ of both sides during Mau Mau.18 Although few details
of his service career are recorded, from what is known of the role
of the settler recruits in the Kenya Regiment it is extremely likely
15that as an Intelligence Officer assigned to interrogating Mau Mau
suspects he would have witnessed — and possibly participated in
— some of the appalling abuses of human rights perpetrated by
the British army.19 Certainly, his military service shook him to the
extent that he resigned his commission at the first opportunity.
20And whether through guilt, grievance, empathy or compassion,
he clearly left with a genuine desire to provide a different set of
opportunities for the next generation of Kenyan youth.
At Starehe Griffin took in often desperately poor boys, many of
whom were homeless, orphaned and embarking upon a life of
25crime. In one early survey of 400 boys admitted to the school,
over half had been arrested and referred to Starehe through the
juvenile courts.20 Conditions in the city ensured that Griffin had a
steady supply of boys to reform. In 1969 one survey estimated
that there were 25,000 boys of primary school age in Nairobi who
30were not enrolled in school.21 Griffin and his assistant, Pat Shaw,
17 Ibid., 38–9; Martin, Anthem of Bugles; Guy Campbell, The Charging Buffalo: A
History of the Kenya Regiment, 1937–1963 (London, 1986); Huw Bennett, Fighting the
Mau Mau: The British Army and Counter-Insurgency in the Kenya Emergency
(Cambridge, 2012); Len Weaver, ‘The Kenya Regiment’, in Malcolm Page (ed.), A
History of the King’s African Rifles and East African Forces (London, 1998), 239–49.
18 King’ala, Autobiography, 39.
19 David Anderson, Histories of the Hanged: Britain’s Dirty War in Kenya and the End
of Empire (London, 2005), 85; Caroline Elkins, Britain’s Gulag: The Brutal End of
Empire in Kenya (2005; London, 2014).
20 G. W. Griffin, ‘The Urban Youth Centre, City of Nairobi: Progress Report,
February 1961 – March 1962’: Andrew Hake Papers (hereafter Hake Papers),
School of Oriental and African Studies, London, PP MS 46/4/84.
21 Andrew Hake, African Metropolis: Nairobi’s Self-Help City (London, 1977), 206–7.
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made notes on all the boys’ life histories, not least to attract
sponsorships and to celebrate individual transformations.22
‘George’, for instance, had been held with boys twice his age in
a Mau Mau detention camp. Upon release and return to his
5district of origin in 1961 he discovered that he was an orphan
and so made his own way to Nairobi, before eventually coming
across Starehe when he was twelve years old. There he flourished,
worked hard for the National Christian Council of Kenya in his
vacations, passed his School Certificate in 1968 and had become
10a full inspector of police by 1972.23
Dozens of other such stories can be found in the archives. Boys
themselves were encouraged to write of what the school had done
for them. Especially in the school publication, Endeavour, boys
wrote of their great fortune in finding their way from the streets or
15a cell to Starehe. They told of family tragedies from disease to
murder, abuse from strangers, lives of crime and vagrancy,
poverty and hunger, arrest and detention and eventual salvation
through Starehe.24 Later on, alumni have provided similar
stories. To quote just one example, Raphael Tuju, director and
20founder of Ace Communications, stated: ‘To you Dr Griffin I owe
so much. When I was 13 years of age, my life was traumatised in
ways I keep finding very difficult to talk about . . . you picked me
up . . . instilled confidence and hope in me’.25 It is no wonder that
many have referred to Griffin as a ‘father’ to whom they ‘owe a
25great debt’.26 And with such results it is also not surprising that
affluent and well-connected parents pressured Griffin to admit
their privileged children too (in 1967 Carlo Iagrosso became
Starehe’s first European pupil27) and politicians have
acknowledged what Griffin has achieved. At his funeral in
302005, President Mwai Kibaki told the thousands of mourners
22 Christian Aid Papers (hereafter CA Archive), SOAS Special Collections, CA2/A/
10/54, Starehe Boys Centre.
23 ‘Starehe Boys Centre: Dormitory Accommodation Proposal’, 1972: Save the
Children Fund Archive (hereafter SCF Archive), Cadbury Research Library,
University of Birmingham, 60.
24 Starehe Boys’ Centre, Endeavour (1969), 13–22: ibid.
25 Raphael Tuju, ‘From a Son to his Father’, in Hongo and Mugambi, Starehe Boys’
Centre, 7–9.
26 Starehe Boys’ Centre, Endeavour (1969), 73: SCF Archive, 60.
27 Starehe Boys’ Centre, Endeavour (1969), 55: ibid.
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that Griffin was ‘a true patriot and great friend of Kenya’s
youth’.28
Behind all these aspects of Starehe’s history are the charitable
donations that have sustained its growth. Griffin first approached
5Shell/BP in Kenya and held a fortuitous meeting with John
Francis, its public relations officer. Griffin took Francis around
some of the hovels and hideouts where homeless boys could be
found in Nairobi, before showing him the rudimentary
rehabilitation initiatives that were then in place. Francis was
10impressed and committed his company to an association with
the school that extended beyond the financial: he drew up the
school constitution, chaired the Starehe management
committee and eased relations with the colonial administration
when questions arose about Griffin’s potentially conflicting
15private and public roles.29 Shell BP provided the original tin
huts for the school, made various capital grants over the years
and contributed to running costs by an amount which had
increased to £6,000 per annum by 1977.30 Other early local and
ex-pat funders included the Sheikh Fazal Noordin Charitable
20Trust, the Child Welfare Society, the Kenya Welfare Trust, the
African Welfare Society, the Roundtable No. 1 and the Welfare
Trust of East Africa. In total these organizations and others would
donate around £13,000 in the first two years of the school’s
existence, enabling up to one hundred boys to become
25boarders.31
However, it was when Griffin turned to the West that really
significant donations started to come in, enabling what was still
a boys ‘club’ to become a school. First, he turned to the UK and
secured £3,000 from the Dulverton Trust. The amount itself was
30not particularly large, but the personal connection was more
important. The Trust’s chair, Lord Dulverton, also sat on the
Council of Oxfam, and would take a special interest in that
NGO’s Africa Committee, even going so far as to attend its first
28 Mwai Kibaki, ‘Speech at burial ceremony of Geoffrey Griffin’, at5http://www.
oldcambrians.com/Obituary-Griffin,Geoffrey.html4(accessed 19 Jan. 2015).
29 J. G. Francis to James Gichuru, minister for finance, 11 July1963: KNA,
A2G1/7/82.
30 Martin, Anthem of Bugles, 151; King’ala, Autobiography, 63–5.
31 Martin, Anthem of Bugles, 7, 23–5.
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Field Directors meeting in Nairobi in 1969.32 Second, Griffin
was aware of his own lack of professional expertise in youth
work and education and so embarked on a brief trip to Los
Angeles and the US to learn about new methods of handling
5delinquent youth. There he rejected most new developments in
psychology and care work, but not before also visiting the offices
of the Ford Foundation. This organization committed itself to
match the funding that had already been raised and gave Griffin
£12,000 in 1961 which enabled him to build a two-storey
10teaching block which he named after the Foundation.33
In 1962 Griffin took two Starehe boys, George Waiwa and Peter
Njenga, to the UK on a Youth-Helps-Youth Campaign. This was
ostensibly to raise funds for the youth centre work which Griffin
was employed by the colonial government to oversee, and which
15aimed to cover the whole of Kenya. Instead he used the trip to
promote his private venture. The visit was much reported in the
press and Griffin was able to exploit his official position to secure a
meeting with Queen Elizabeth, the Lord Mayor of London and
Cliff Richard (who would reciprocate by visiting the school the
20following year, performing his songs for the boys in the school
hall).34 More importantly, Griffin’s visit consolidated his
connections to the headquarters of the SCF, of which the
queen was patron. The charity was to become Starehe’s most
important backer, funding the school from 1964 through to
251996. Rather than financing one-off capital costs, SCF
committed to the long term by providing an annual grant of
£8,000 to cover running costs such as teachers’ salaries. By the
1970s SCF was spending up to £50,000 per year in Kenya, the
vast bulk of which found its way to Starehe.35 It enabled, for
30instance, Starehe to offer competitive salaries that ensured that
the school could recruit eight of the very best primary school
teachers, including former headmasters, from across Nairobi in
1964. No mention has been found of what this transfer of skilled
labour did for those schools not fortunate enough to obtain the
35foreign funding needed to retain their best staff.
32 Minutes of second Africa Field Directors’ Conference, Nairobi, 23–24 Jan 1969:
Oxfam Archives (hereafter Oxfam MSS), Bodleian Library, Oxford, PRG 2/3/1/1.
33 Martin, Anthem of Bugles, 25–6.
34 ‘Schools and Clubs Asked to Adopt Kenyan Child’, Guardian, 5 Dec. 1962.
35 Martin, Anthem of Bugles, 29, 77.
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SCF had been active in Kenya for some time. Operation Anvil,
of April 1954, designed to intern thousands of Mau Mau
sympathisers among the Kikuyu, also swept up hundreds of
children who were held at Langata detention camp. Many were
5passed on to missions attached to bodies such as the Church
Missionary Society and the Christian Council of Kenya, backed
by donors such as Christian Aid and with the support of the
British government.36 But, unable to cope with the numbers,
international humanitarian agencies such as the Red Cross were
10called in to deal with the repercussions of the mass repression.
Operation Anvil also resulted in an explosion of homeless and
delinquent youth in Nairobi, some of whom were dealt with by
SCF’s Place of Safety in the city. But something more extensive
was felt to be required. In late 1954 the SCF general secretary,
15Brigadier T. W. Boyce, met with the secretary of state for the
Colonies, Alan Lennox-Boyd, and called for an ‘Operation
Anvil for children’.37 SCF committed to running a camp at
Ujana Park, to be modelled on its Serendah school in Malaya
(likewise experiencing an Emergency) and which, like Starehe
20later, would provide education as well as games and
occupational training.38 For Boyce, who believed that Kikuyu
women formed ‘a very hard core in the Mau Mau’, the camp/
school would serve to ‘soften them down . . . through the
children’.39 Lack of official funding as the Emergency eased
25meant that Ujana soon closed down, and the Child Welfare
Society absorbed SCF’s limited Kenyan activities.40
Griffin would inherit some of these initiatives. From 1957 he
was employed by the government’s Department of Community
Development to run Youth Training Centres (referred to as Youth
36 Janet Lacey, ‘Report on visit to Kenya in January 1955 to discuss the possibility of
Inter-Church Aid participation in rehabilitation schemes planned by the Christian
Council of Kenya’, 14 Mar. 1955, and ‘Report of a visit to South Africa, Southern
Rhodesia and Kenya’, 24 Apr. 1956: CA Archive, CA/A/4/3.
37 ‘Notes of a meeting held in Secretary of State’s rooms’, 17 Nov. 1954: The
National Archives, Kew (hereafter TNA), CO 859/660.
38 T. W. Boyce to SCF Council Members, 8 June 1955; Alan Lennox-Boyd to
Boyce, 9 June 1955: ibid.
39 Boyce to Lennox-Boyd, 1 June 1955: ibid..
40 Elkins, Britain’s Gulag, 58; Brigadier T. W. Boyce, ‘Report on proposals from the
Government of Kenya for the re-establishment of SCF aid’, 16 Aug. 1960: SCF
Archive, box 147, file: Kenya 1960; G. W. Griffin, ‘The urban youth centre project,
city of Nairobi: progress report, July 1959 – February 1961’, 9 Feb. 1961: KNA,
AB/14/49.
13 of 41CHARITY, DECOLONIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT
[25.8.2016–9:22am] [1–42] Paper: OP-PAST160043
MANUSCRIPT CATEGORY: ARTICLE
Clubs in Kenya) and Juvenile Reception Centres which assessed
children’s needs and repatriated them to their home areas if
families could be found. In 1960 he was encouraged by his
employers to ask NGOs again to take on certain social welfare
5responsibilities. In the report that he wrote with his friend Roger
Owles, they glossed over much of the government’s own actions
in displacing hundreds of thousands of Kikuyu and instead
attributed the rising number of urban homeless youth to ‘the
incipient breakdown of tribal responsibility caused by the social
10changes from subsistence to cash economy in the rural area, and
the rapid urban development’.41 Amidst this ‘crisis of youth’, a
common trope of late-imperialist social welfare, they asked SCF
to again fund a Place of Safety in the Kariokor district of Nairobi
to take in boys found wandering the streets.42
15SCF duly responded and began also to take an interest in
Griffin’s private work at nearby Starehe too. Having appointed
a new administrator for Kenya in 1961, SCF remained in
frequent contact with Griffin.43 He ensured that SCF
maintained its support for the Kariokor Place of Safety while
20also informing SCF of his more ambitious long-term plans for
his other centre which he hoped to ‘run more on the lines of a good
boarding school’ and which he felt was ‘much more in keeping
with the ideal of SCF’.44 In 1962 the SCF administrator began to
develop plans to establish a network of ‘Places of Safety’ around
25the country, working in liaison with the Kenyan government. But
at this point Griffin seems to have persuaded SCF along another
route, effectively throwing into confusion the boundaries
between his own private initiatives, his work as a civil servant
and the supposedly independent operations of a British charity.
30In 1962 he moved the Place of Safety to the same premises as
Starehe, creating instead a ‘Rescue Centre’ at Kariokor which
SCF financed. The idea was a ‘complementary’ system with
each of his three institutions forming part of ‘an overall
pattern’. The Kariokor Rescue Centre, based in one of the
41 Boyce, ‘Report on proposals’, 16 Aug 1960, SCF Archive, box 147, file: Kenya
1960.
42 On the problem of youth generally at this time see Paul Ocobock, An Uncertain
Age: Making Manhood, Maturity, and Authority in Kenya, 1898–1978 (Athens, Oh.,
2016), ch. 8.
43 I. G. Brown, ‘Report for period 1 October – 14 November 1961’: SCF Archive,
box 147, file: Kenya 1960.
44 I. G. Brown, ‘Nairobi Place of Safety’, 26 Nov. 1961: ibid.
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city’s poorest slums, took boys in for the night and gave
them a meal. If they so requested, they could then be moved
on to the Place of Safety where a case-worker would try to get
the boy back to his family. At the same time he would attend
5classes at the co-located Starehe Centre, to which he might
ultimately transfer if no other forms of support could be found
for him.
After consolidating his connections with SCF on his UK tour,
Griffin returned to Kenya to also become SCF’s local
10administrator, adding a new international charitable role to
stand alongside his local official and voluntary functions.45
Despite the obvious potential for conflicts of interest, the SCF
hierarchy had nothing but praise for his achievements at this time,
further believing that his own personal administrative qualities
15trumped any difficulties arising from the blurring of his different
positions.46 As such, what Griffin had managed to put in place by
1963 was a system of social welfare that not only blurred the
boundary between the official and unofficial spheres, but
collapsed the distinction between short-term humanitarian
20relief and long-term development. Griffin’s institutions cared
for the children from initial ‘rescue’, to immediate ‘safety’, to
long term ‘comfort’. This was significant since NGOs in Britain
had to navigate the intricacies and whims of charity legislation
and public opinion, both of which could be uncomfortable with
25aid rather than relief.47 In addition, many staff within these
organizations were likewise uneasy about taking on longer term
projects that did not appear to deal with immediate suffering and
which seemed to take their organization beyond its original
charitable statutes.48 Just about every charity underwent
30internal disputes as to their appropriate levels of commitment
45 I. G. Brown, ‘Suggestions for extension of work in the field’, 2 Apr. 1962, and
‘Memorandum on the Kariokor Rescue Centre’, 31 Oct 1962; J. V. Hawkins, ‘Place of
Safety – Nairobi/Kenya’, Nov. 1962: ibid.; G. W. Griffin, ‘Kenya: Report’, 1963, and
W. E. Evans, ‘Impressions of the Kariokor Rescue Centre’, Feb. 1963: ibid., Kenya
1963.
46 [?] Dearden, [?] Harper and [?] Miller, ‘Joint Report on the Visit to Kenya and
Uganda’, 1969: SCF Archive, 60.
47 James McKay, ‘Voluntary Politics: The Sector’s Political Function from
Beveridge to Deakin’, in Melanie Oppenheimer and Nicholas Deakin (eds.),
Beveridge and Voluntary Action in Britain and the Wider British World (Manchester,
2011).
48 Matthew Hilton, James McKay, Nicholas Crowson and Jean-Franc¸ois Mouhot,
The Politics of Expertise: How NGOs Shaped Modern Britain (Oxford, 2013), 113–14.
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to the competing demands of short-term relief and long term-
development. Whether intentionally or not, Griffin’s three
institutions skirted round these thorny issues, enabling charities
to tell different stories to different audiences about the precise
5goals and nature of their work amidst the Eastlands slums.
The networks born of imperialism that SCF facilitated also
linked up to its other, more internationalist connections. SCF
made itself the gateway to a whole world of funding that Griffin
could never have imagined. It put Griffin in contact with its global
10counterpart, the International Union of Child Welfare, the
secretary-general of which, Dr Mulock Houwer, visited in
1964. He referred to Starehe as the ‘flower in the mud’ that
constituted ‘a model project for Africa’ and, most importantly,
he took the decision to support Starehe alone rather than the
15Kenya National Council of Social Service, the then
government-supported body which dealt with the voluntary
sector as a whole throughout the country.49 Houwer assisted
Griffin by publicizing the total costs of £31,000 that would be
needed to build a secondary school.50 Other organizations
20responded to the call. A Nuffield Foundation contribution of
£18,650 was followed by two grants of £10,000 and £17,000
from the Danish government to build laboratories and staff
apartments (plus further substantial support from the Danish
scouts), £15,000 for a boarding house from the Bernard van
25Leer Foundation based in The Hague and £35,000 from the
Dutch Government to build an Assembly Hall and workshops.
In 1967 the IUCW itself responded with a £65,000 donation to
build a new three-storey primary school, and it facilitated
contacts between Starehe and SCF sister organizations around
30the world. Pat Shaw particularly fostered these connections. He
would go on to visit Denmark every summer, publicizing the work
of the school and encouraging people to sponsor children’s school
fees through a scheme co-ordinated by the Danish Save the
Children, Red Barnet.51
49 Colin Thornley, ‘IUCW Joint Action in Kenya’, 13 Sept. 1967: SCFArchive, 60.
50 Martin, Anthem of Bugles, 48.
51 Af Caspar Strand, Red Barnets historie – En fortælling om 60 a˚rs udvikling og arbejde
(Copenhagen, 2005); G. W. Griffin, ‘Kenya: Assisting Deprived, Vagrant, Orphaned
and otherwise Needy Boys In Kenya’, Feb. 1967: SCF Archive, box 147, file: Kenya
1967; Martin, Anthem of Bugles, 61–3.
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Fundamental to the early success of Starehe were Britain’s
other leading humanitarian charities. Following a request
filtered through the Freedom From Hunger Campaign,
Christian Aid administered a sponsorship scheme for the boys,
5raising funds from individual supporters and groups such as the
Boys Brigade.52 Once the connection was established, Griffin
wrote frequently of his duties to meet the needs of his
‘dependent’ boys and haggled continuously for further funds,
be it to support additional teachers or to fund capital projects.53
10Outstripping these donations, however, were those from Oxfam.
SCF first approached Oxfam in 1963 to see if the latter would
assist its work at the school. Oxfam was impressed and duly gave
£11,000 to build and equip a classroom. This was followed by a
further substantial grant of £15,300 to construct a two-storey
15workshop block and dormitory in 1965, the latter named after
H. Leslie Kirkley, the then director of Oxfam. In total, Oxfam
gave the school around £43,000 over a decade.54 Its assistance
was crucial to enabling Starehe to be granted a registration
certificate, thereby making it possible for boys to sit the
20national preliminary examinations. The charity was in no doubt
that it was money well spent. As its Overseas Aid Director put it in
1968, ‘Something of a miracle has been worked in the lives of
many of the children’.55
Within just a few years from its establishment, Starehe had
25captured the imagination of many around the world and a
steady stream of visitors had passed through its doors. While
visits by royalty and politicians such as Senator Robert
Kennedy and Indira Gandhi were crucial to Griffin’s
philanthropic ambitions, highlights for the boys were more
30likely to have been Mohammad Ali’s visit, plus an impromptu
football training match that Pat Shaw arranged with Pele at the
52 FFHC Requests to Board Meeting, 10 Mar. 1966; Griffin to Gerald Walker,
secretary of London District Boys’ Brigade, 19 Nov. 1966: CA Archive, CA2/A/10/4.
53 B. J. Dudbridge, Memo, 21 Feb. 1966; ‘Kenya: Starehe Boys’ Home’, 1967;
Barber, Bellhouse, Mwangi & Co., ‘Starehe Boys Centre: Auditors’ Report’, 29
Mar. 1967; Griffin to [?] Lacey, 17 July 1967; Pat Shaw to Heather Webster, 28
Feb 1968: CA Archive, CA2/A/10/4.
54 Minutes of Africa Committee, 1 Sept. 1966: Oxfam MSS, PRG/1/3/1; Grants
lists, 1962–89: COM/1/1/3/1; Information Dept Country Files: Kenya (1), 1965–90:
COM/2/9/9.
55 Bernard Llewellyn, ‘Visit to Kenya and Tanzania, Nov. – Dec. 1968’, 3 Jan 1969:
ibid., PRG/1/3/2.
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Uhuru stadium.56 The fascination with the school has extended
to academics and educationalists, idealistic volunteers from
across Europe and teachers on exchanges from English public
schools. A particularly productive connection was made with
5Christ’s Hospital in Britain, a school similarly run on public
school lines but with an intake of children based on a range of
— arguably dubious — charitable criteria. Volunteers such as
Peter Attenborough introduced many of Christ’s customs while
others such as Roger Martin developed long-lasting connections
10which would see him publish Starehe’s first history, Anthem of
Bugles, in 1978.
The only apparent blip in this constant stream of praise came in
1969. To mark its fiftieth anniversary, SCF commissioned the
left-wing British social realist film-maker Ken Loach to make a
15film of its work. He travelled to Kenya and focused on Starehe,
arguing against the transfer of English public school customs to
the local African context as well as engaging in a broad-ranging
critique of neo-colonialism in which he implicated ‘sticking
plaster’ charities such as SCF. As a piece of propaganda, the
20film was an unmitigated ‘disaster’, and SCF aggressively
pursued Loach to ensure an extensive cover-up that resulted in
the film being effectively banned (it was not aired in public until
2011).57
But Loach’s film provoked SCF into acknowledging that it had
25an image problem. SCF recognised that it had fallen behind the
trends in humanitarianism and development that in the 1960s
saw an increasing turn to radicalism and political advocacy by
bodies such as Christian Aid and Oxfam, particularly after the
Haslemere Declaration of 1968 which called upon the
30government to increase its aid budget.58 The 1960s brought a
new generation of committed internationalists to the aid sector
who highlighted the benefits of grassroots, local initiatives. To the
British public, Starehe was able to present itself as embodying
such a new spirit, while also remaining firmly part of the
56 ‘Griffin, ‘Visit to Kenya by Senator Kennedy’, 6 June 1966: KNA, NYS/1/327;
Starehe Boys’ Centre, Endeavour (1969), 70–1: SCF Archive, 60; Martin, Anthem of
Bugles, 169.
57 Matthew Hilton, ‘Ken Loach and the Save the Children Film: Humanitarianism,
Imperialism and the Changing Role of Charity in postwar Britain’, Journal of Modern
History, lxxxvii (2015).
58 Haslemere Committee, The Haslemere Declaration (London, 1968).
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‘establishment’. In particular, Griffin’s work in promoting his
school in Britain led to the creation in 1970 of the UK Starehe
Association, which would be chaired by Paul Whitehouse, a
senior career police officer who had served, in a voluntary
5capacity, as Starehe’s assistant bursar from 1963 to 1964.59
More significant still was the interest expressed in Starehe by
Princess Anne, who became president of SCF in 1970 while still
only 19 years of age. Her advisors were keen to make a
documentary to promote her charitable work, while both
10Griffin and the SCF were keen to make another film about
Starehe rather different in tone from that of Loach’s.60 Anne’s
interest increased SCF’s resolve to make the school the focus of
much of its activity in Africa and it renewed its efforts to convince
other donors of the Starehe cause.61 The British High
15Commission in Kenya worked closely with Kenyatta, SCF and
Griffin to ensure that the royal visitor’s trip to Starehe (as well as
the Rescue Centre and Place of Safety) went as smoothly as
possible.62 She visited in February 1971, accompanied by the
popular TV presenter Valerie Singleton, and the resulting film
20was released as a Blue Peter special at peak viewing time on
Easter Sunday.63 It proved to be a huge success for both
Starehe and the SCF.64 It was followed by a special Blue Peter
publication and a Christmas Appeal later in the year, as well as
a follow-up film in 1972 and a presentation on Starehe by
25Kenyatta when Queen Elizabeth visited the same year.65
Princess Anne has continued to support the school up to the
59 The charity is now known as Starehe Future:5http://www.oldcambrians.com/
Obituary-Griffin,Geoffrey.html4.
60 Griffin, ‘‘‘Boys of Starehe’’ film’, 30 Sept. 1970: KNA, NYS/1/327.
61 W. N. Hibbert, ‘Report on visit to Kenya’, Jan 1971; ‘List of trusts and trustees to
be approached for Starehe’, 13 Jan 1971: SCF Archive, 60.
62 Director of fundraising, ‘Memo’, 13 Jan 1971; Director of fundraising to Mary
Dawnay, 19 Feb. 1971: SCF Archive, 48, file: ‘The President Film: The Princess and
the Children’.
63 BBC Press Release, 7 Apr. 197: ibid.
64 Brian Holden to Shaw, 29 Apr. 1971; Shaw to Holden, 4 May 1971: SCF
Archive, 883.
65 Biddy Baxter and Edward Barnes, Blue Peter Royal Safari with H.R.H. Princess
Anne and Valerie Singleton (London, 1971), 8. One ironic consequence of the visit is
that SCF’s work became so well known in East Africa that when the austerity three-day
week was introduced in Britain in 1973, Uganda’s President, Idi Amin, cheekily
announced the creation of a Save Britain Fund to assist his former colonial masters
in their hour of need: Dominic Sandbrook, State of Emergency: The Way We Were:
Britain, 1970–1974 (London, 2011), 593.
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present day, visiting on several occasions and securing yet more
philanthropic connections and donations.66
Moreover, other aid agencies jumped onto what was becoming
something of a philanthropic bandwagon. In Britain, Oxfam
5propaganda in the press took advantage of its existing Starehe
links, while Childcare International and the leftist War on Want
joined Christian Aid in running sponsorship schemes for Starehe
pupils and CAFOD provided the materials to run an accredited
City and Guilds vocational course.67 Save the Children
10organizations elsewhere, especially in Canada, Denmark and
Sweden, contributed heavily to sponsorships and other forms of
help, as did bodies such as the Christian Children’s Fund of
America, NOVIB in the Netherlands, Kindernothilfe and Brot
fu¨r die Welt in Germany, the Musgrave Charitable Trust in
15Ireland, the Ford Foundation and the Moore Foundation in the
US and Rettet das Kind in Austria.68 These private funds were
substantially improved by other larger grants from the
governments of Germany, Sweden, Denmark and the
Netherlands, as well as the European Economic Community.
20By the 1980s the Starehe fund-raising machinery resembled
that of many of the leading private schools from around the
world. A successful Aim High Appeal in 1996, for instance,
raised £1million for an endowment permanently to support
100 pupils every year.69 Charities have consequently doubted
25whether the school was the most appropriate beneficiary of so
much private philanthropy. The Danish scouts’ funding of a
swimming pool does appear a peculiar interpretation of
development ‘needs’, though the symbolism of the provision of
such a luxury otherwise denied to non-white Kenyans was
30significant. NGOs have worried that funding might be better
directed towards more pressing concerns and they have been
66 Starehe Management Council minutes, 1982: KNA, XK/1/12; ‘Princess Anne
praises Starehe’, Kenya Standard, 1 Oct. 1998: SCF Archive, 857.
67 John Davies, ‘I am Oxfam’, Guardian, 12 May 1971; Martin, Anthem of Bugles,
75, 154.
68 Griffin to P. J. Gachathi, Ministry of Education, 27 July 1971; Griffin to
Gachathi, 29 Dec. 1972; Griffin, ‘Starehe: Planning for the Future: A Report to the
Ministry of Education’, Feb. 1978: KNA, XJ/27/85; Ojiambo, ‘Educating modern
Kenyans’, 147–8. Retter das Kind is not affiliated to the international Save the Children
federation.
69 Various extensive papers related to the Aim High Appeal: SCF Archive, 859;
Honjo and Mugambi, Starehe Boys’ Centre, 75–88; King’ala, Autobiography, 70.
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uncomfortable with the fact that the ongoing nature of charitable
donations goes against the spirit of the self-sustaining
development project which many initially believed Starehe to
be. Oxfam ceased to support Starehe by the late 1970s precisely
5because of these concerns. Likewise, Red Barnet eventually
wound down its sponsorship programme in 2001 and even the
British SCF began to pull back on its operations in the late 1990s
after Aim High had succeeded.
But the overall support for the school from the West has
10been really quite staggering. While each individual grant may
well have been given as a specific and isolated form of
assistance to a grassroots, self-help and local development
initiative, collectively the amounts raised take on the scale of an
official development project, albeit targeted at just one school.
15Starehe provided the opportunity for charities and their
supporters to be seen to be doing something, and doing
something quickly and effectively. It provided both immediate
humanitarian relief and long-term development assistance
which enabled two tropes of humanitarian propaganda — the
20hungry child and the smiling black face — to be presented at
one and the same time. And it operated through a mechanism
— the traditional English public school system — that was, to
many donors, both personally familiar and pedagogically
sound. Moreover, donations could be made by charities in the
25knowledge that the school was also supported by the newly
independent Kenyan state. It is here, in Starehe and Griffin’s
relationship to both late-colonial and independent government,
that we can begin to trace a more complex story of development
from a very different angle.
30II
To understand the support for Starehe within Kenya, it is
illuminating to reflect on the alternative career of Griffin’s chief
administrator at the school. Patrick David Shaw was one of
Kenya’s most infamous police officers, having joined the Police
35Reserve in 1959. From the 1960s until his death in 1988 he
patrolled the streets of Nairobi ferociously dealing with the
city’s most violent gangs. His biographer estimates that possibly
hundreds died as a result of his eagerness to use his .38 special to
execute justice on the spot. Weighing in at well over 300 pounds
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he was a formidable spectacle and he and his specially reinforced
Volvo became a legendary presence within the capital. His
operations were hardly under cover and even his codename,
‘ROMEO 9’ was widely known. He famously killed Kenya’s
5most wanted criminal Wakinyonga in 1978 and was widely
believed to have been involved in the assassination of the
opposition political leader J. M. Kariuki three years earlier.
Shaw was not some wayward cop, a white throwback to a
colonial regime when Special Branch had acquired a brutal
10reputation interrogating Mau Mau suspects. His work was
supported by the highest authorities and his additional work at
Starehe was well known. He rose to the rank of senior
superintendent and was awarded the Silver Star by President
Daniel arap Moi just before his death in 1988. Moi’s words at
15Shaw’s funeral described him as ‘constant, selfless, sacrificial’.70
Shaw’s position at Starehe helps us to understand the
importance of the school within Kenyan society and politics.
Shaw first met Griffin on the latter’s fundraising trip to the UK
in 1962 when Shaw himself was on leave from his then job with
20the Agricultural Department. He returned to become a volunteer
at Starehe, and soon afterwards his salary was being directly
funded by SCF. Indeed, it was this daytime employment which
enabled Shaw to work for the Kenyan police as a volunteer. Like
Griffin, Shaw served more than one master, though it was Starehe
25that commanded his ultimate loyalty (he forfeited part of his
salary as a donation to the school). But it is the respect and
support that both men courted and captured from Kenya’s
elites that explains another side to Starehe’s success.
While the school’s financial stability relied on the philanthropic
30networks available through its colonial connections, its political
legitimacy came through its close relationship to official
70 Scan: Starehe Comment and News, Feb 1988, 1, 4–5; ‘Patrick Shaw obituary’,
Weekly Review, 19 Feb. 1988, 19: KNA, XK/1/12; David Zucchino, ‘A Kenyan
Lawman: Large in Life, Now Larger in Legend’, Kenya Inquirer, 13 Mar 1988,
at5http://articles.philly.com/1988-03-13/news/26277319_1_nairobi-police-radio-
kenya-police4(accessed 19 Jan. 2016); David Smith, ‘Investigating Patrick
Shaw, Kenya’s most dreaded cop’, Kenya Daily Nation, 25 Mar. 2013, at5http://
www.nation.co.ke/Features/DN2/Patrick-Shaw/-/957860/1728956/-/uvolk3/-/index.
html4(accessed 19 Jan. 2015); David Smith, ‘Kenya: Kablam! The only language
Patrick Shaw spoke’, African Culture Direct, 26 Mar. 2013, at5http://
africanculturedirect.blogspot.co.uk/2013/03/kablam-only-language-patrick-shaw-
spoke.html4(accessed 19 Jan. 2015).
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post-colonial power, particularly via Griffin and Shaw. Starehe
clearly appealed to the new rulers of Kenya. Jomo Kenyatta
conferred the motto, Natulenge Juu! (‘Let Us Aim High’), and
was a frequent early visitor, as was J. M. Kariuki (before his fall
5from political favour and subsequent demise) and also Tom
Mboya, the trade unionist and nationalist leader who served as
minister for economic planning and development in Kenyatta’s
government. After Mboya’s assassination in 1969, he was
replaced as patron of the school by Minister of Finance Mwai
10Kibaki, a fortuitous appointment given that he in turn would
become vice-president in 1978 and president in 2002. Between
Presidents Kenyatta and Kibaki, however, was Daniel arap Moi,
also a frequent visitor to the school, leading the services at the
founders’ day in 1969 and being the guest of honour at various
15celebratory events through to the fortieth anniversary of the
school in 1999. Their patronage was followed by additional
support, not least through the payment of many teachers’
salaries and the various land grants (totalling forty-eight acres)
that have been made to support its physical expansion.71
20But it is the particular ethos of the school that warrants further
explanation. That Shaw’s brutal exploits with the night-time
criminals of Nairobi could become well known, not only to
Starehe’s financial backers and the Kenyan public but also the
school’s pupils, is significant. Shaw exercised a firm hand over the
25capital’s discordant elements that fitted in with an ‘ideology of
order’ that has been argued to have been the chief characteristic of
post-independence Kenyan politics and which has overshadowed
other political liberties and civil rights.72 This in turn coalesced
with the particular focus on discipline that Griffin exercised
30within the school and which he learned from his experiences in
dealing with Mau Mau. Griffin participated in new methods of
71 Griffin, ‘Address by the Founder on the Occasion of the Centre’s 40
th
anniversary’, 24 July 1999, in Hongo and Mugambi, Starehe Boys’ Centre, 118;
Griffin, ‘Starehe: Planning for the Future’, 14 Feb. 1978; Griffin to Gachathi,
Ministry of Education, 6 Nov 1970; A. K. Kiriro, Nairobi provincial education
officer, to Gachathi, 19 Sept. 1974: KNA, XJ/27/85.
72 E. S. Atieno Odhiambo, ‘Democracy and the Ideology of Order in Kenya’, in
Michael G. Schatzburg (ed.), The Political Economy of Kenya (New York, 1987). The
concept has been most usefully deployed by the historians Daniel Branch and Nic
Cheeseman in their ‘Introduction: Our Turn to Eat’, in Daniel Branch, Nic
Cheeseman and Leigh Gardner (eds.), Our Turn to Eat: Politics in Kenya since 1950
(Berlin, 2010).
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institutional rehabilitation which he subsequently adapted to fit
in with both the English public school tradition and Kenyatta’s
catch-all notion of harambee.
Griffin’s disillusionment with the British armed forces’ tactics
5of interrogation and detention of the Kikuyu actually coincided
with a more liberal imperialist promotion of rehabilitation. Early
on in the Emergency, Tom Askwith, the colonial government
community development officer, promoted the idea developed
by a number of ethno-psychologists such as Louis Leakey and J.
10C. Carothers that Mau Mau rebels could be ‘cured’ though re-
education and rehabilitation. This provided a rationale for the
British government’s development of detention centres as these
were to be the sites for an intensive hearts and minds operation.73
As Caroline Elkins has put it, this was a ‘curious moment for
15liberal reform’ though one which would come to be almost
wholly overshadowed by the forms of torture and brutality that
became the norm of the camps, particularly as practised by
Special Branch (the police unit that Shaw himself joined).74
Nevertheless, Askwith maintained his position despite the
20overwhelming defiance of his principles at the Mau Mau
detention camps and was able to carve a tiny niche for his
slightly more enlightened approach.75
Shortly after leaving the army Griffin and his friend Roger
Owles took up posts in 1955 as community development
25officers in Askwith’s new ministry. They were employed at
Manyani Detention Camp to identify underage boys who were
being held inappropriately, with adults and more seasoned Mau
Mau rebels.76 Viewed with suspicion by both the inmates and
Special Branch, Griffin nevertheless identified around 1,000
30children of sixteen years or less. On these he was then able to
practise a more liberal form of rehabilitation at Wamumu
Approved School and Youth Camp in 1955. Unlike all other
forms of detention and supposed ‘rehabilitation’ during the
Emergency, Wamumu has been described as ‘a paradise for
73 Anderson, Histories of the Hanged, 281–4
74 Elkins, Britain’s Gulag, 110
75 A. R. Baggallay, ‘Myths of Mau Mau Expanded: Rehabilitation in Kenya’s
Detention Camps, 1954–60’, Journal of Eastern African Studies, v (2011).
76 Kinga’ala, Autobiography, 45–7
24 of 41 PAST AND PRESENT
[25.8.2016–9:22am] [1–42] Paper: OP-PAST160043
MANUSCRIPT CATEGORY: ARTICLE
young Mau Mau suspects’ that stood out for its entirely
exceptional approach.77
Along with Owles and his superior officer, Captain George
Gardener, Griffin embarked on a hearts and minds operation
5that drew extensively from his limited experience, made up as it
was of his own schooling and officer training. He reduced the
armed personnel at the camp from 200 to 40, obtained a blanket
pardon for the boys from the attorney-general and set to work to
win their trust, turning them away from the ideology of Mau Mau
10and towards becoming useful colonial citizens. In practice this
meant strong discipline but also the creation of educational
classes, skills training, physical exercise and competitive sports.
The boys built their own classrooms, recreational grounds and a
church. Following Gardener’s lead, Griffin introduced
15rudimentary khaki uniforms, Reveille, flag parades on Empire
Day, a house system (four out of five of which were named after
colonial Kenyan ‘pioneers’: Boyes, Delamere, Grogan and
Lugard), prefects (adapted to the local context in that the role
was only available to the circumcised, which had the effect of
20clearly demarcating an internal hierarchy) and a Boy Scouts
troop (Griffin himself had been Kenya’s first ever King’s Scout
and would become, along with Shaw, a member of the Kenya
Scout Council).78 Almost all of this prefigured many of his
initiatives at Starehe. He even introduced a motto, ‘Truth and
25Loyalty’, that might well have been used for his later school. And
the famous Starehe school council, baraza, was borrowed directly
from Wamumu where it was used as an informal public meeting
where boys could relate their past experiences to the group and
‘cleanse’ themselves of Mau Mau.79
77 Elkins, Britain’s Gulag, 289; Ojiambo, ‘Educating Modern Kenyans’, 196–209.
78 Ocobock, An Uncertain Age, ch. 7; Timothy H. Parsons, Race, Resistance and the
Boy Scout Movement in British Colonial Africa (Athens, Oh., 2004), 172–3; G. K.
Gathu, Kenya Boys Scouts Association, to Griffin, 1 July 1966: KNA, NYS/1/234.
79 Ojiambo, ‘Educating Modern Kenyans’, 219–28;Smith Hempstone, ‘Wamumu:
The Old School Tie’, Institute of Current World Affairs: Letters by Former Fellows, 29 June
1957, at5http://www.icwa.org/txtArticles/SH-27.htm4(accessed 19 Jan. 2016);
Hongo and Mugambi, Starehe Boys’ Centre, 27–8; Kinga’ala, Autobiography, 49–56;
Martin, Anthem of Bugles,49–56; Paul Ocobock, ‘Generation Mau Mau: Constructing
Rites of Passage in Late Colonial Kenya’, unpublished paper , at5http://www.
academia.edu/4865235/Generation_Mau_Mau_Constructing_Rites_of_Passage_
in_Late_Colonial_Kenya4(accessed 19 Jan. 2016).
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As John Lonsdale has argued, for certain individuals such as
Griffin, Mau Mau recreated ‘the cross-racial loyalties of the
frontier and paradoxically, turn[ed] some whites into Kenyans
with no other home’.80 After Wamumu, Griffin’s work as
5Colony Youth Organizer led to the creation of two self-help
clubs and schools throughout Kenya, though it was at Starehe
— which he set up in his spare time — that he was able to
implement fully what he had learned at the camp. Most
significantly, he sought out two former Wamumu inmates to
10assist him at Starehe and to confer a legitimacy upon his
enterprise among the local community. Geoffrey Geturo
Gatama, a former clerk caught up in the indiscriminate sweep
of Operation Anvil, became a leader of the other boys in the
camp and an assistant to Owles and Griffin.81 From a much
15poorer background, Joseph Kamiru Gikubu had been a fully
signed up Mau Mau sympathiser and oath administrator.
Slightly older, he likewise became a ‘school captain’ and would
later follow Owles to work at an approved school in Othaya.82 In
1959 Griffin persuaded both former detainees to join him at
20Starehe. Gikubu was placed in charge of the Kariokor Rescue
Centre and Geturo became principal of the school itself. Owles
himself later joined Griffin as an officer in the National Youth
Service and regularly volunteered to help with the school band.83
Together they implemented a regime that drew directly from
25their experience of Wamumu. Not only was the institutional
language of ‘Places of Safety’, ‘reception centres’ and ‘youth
clubs’ (for many years Starehe retained its nomenclature as a
club rather than a school) directly taken from the rehabilitative
80 John Lonsdale, ‘Kenya: Home County and African Frontier’, in Robert Bickers
(ed.), Settlers and Expatriates: Britons Over the Seas (Oxford, 2010), 108–9.
81 Hongo and Mugambi, Starehe Boys’ Centre, 44–6; Kinga’ala, Autobiography, 65.
82 Kwamchetsi Mokokha, ‘Life Lessons on Sincerity from Starehe Co-Founder
Joseph Gikubu’, Daily Nation, 9 May 2014, at5http://mobile.nation.co.ke/blogs/-/
1949942/2309168/-/format/xhtml/-/vmu545/-/index.html4(accessed 19 Jan.
2016); John Njiru, ‘Starehe Boys Co-Founder Joseph Gikubu Passes On’, Daily
Nation, 8 May 2014, at5http://mobile.nation.co.ke/news/Starehe-Boys-cofounder-
Joseph-Gikubu-passes-on/-/1950946/2307808/-/format/xhtml/-/jg7746z/-/index.
html4(accessed 19 Jan. 2015); ‘Past Directors: Jospeh Kamiru Gikubu’, Starehe
Future, at5http://www.starehe.org/schools/past_directors.html4(accessed 19 Jan.
2015); Martin, Anthem of Bugles, 40–1; Hongo and Mugambi, Starehe Boys’ Centre,
40–3; Peter Ojiambo, ‘Gift of Education: Joseph Kamiru Gikubu and the
Development of Kenyan Youth Education from 1957 to the present’, Africa Review,
vii (2015).
83 Shaw to Roger Owles, 5 June 1969: KNA, NYS/1/259.
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principles of Askwith’s model of community development and
colonial youth policy more generally, but the actual practical
methods implemented at Wamumu found their way into the
school.84 Starehe became a curious mixture of rehabilitation
5camp and English public school, though Griffin believed the
two to be entirely compatible. School houses, scout troops,
opportunities for social service and the famous marching band
have been pillars of the school’s ethos from the very beginning.
The central emphasis of all of Griffin’s rhetoric about his
10educational philosophy has been the trust that he has claimed
to have placed in the boys. But such trust, he clearly believed,
could only survive within a highly ordered environment.
Discipline was therefore crucial to how the school functioned.
This is not to go so far as to argue that discipline overshadowed
15trust in the same manner as discipline and brutality
overshadowed rehabilitation in the Mau Mau camps. But it is
to argue that the Emergency provided a stimulus to discipline
that Griffin’s experience in the army reinforced. In the late-
colonial and early post-colonial periods, Griffin clearly believed
20that tough discipline was a necessary backbone to everything else
that went on at the school. He took personal responsibility for all
disciplinary matters, possibly as a deliberate counterpoint to the
perceived arbitrariness of white colonial justice. Teachers were
not permitted to execute their own punishments and all
25offending boys were instead referred to him. In the early days of
the school, he clearly believed in the importance of being ‘tough’
with boys who had been brought up on the streets. He was not
against prefects ‘knocking [a boy] cold’ before presenting him for
further, more structured punishment. One of the most contrived
30was a system known as ‘D’ which he took directly from
Wamumu.85 Here, the offender would be kept separate from
the other boys, interviewed daily by Geturo or Gikubo and set
to manual work.86 Even his extraordinarily sympathetic
biographer tells remarkable stories of how quick Griffin was to
84 Ocobock, An Uncertain Age, ch. 8, and ‘‘‘Joy Rides for Juveniles’’: Vagrant Youth
and Colonial Control in Nairobi, Kenya, 1901–52’, Social History, xxxi (2006), 39–59;
Ellen Boucher, ‘The Emotional Requirements of Postcolonial Citizenship: Outward
Bound and Survival Training in Nigeria and Kenya, 1951–1963’, paper presented to
North American Conference on British Studies, Nov. 2014.
85 Ocobock, An Uncertain Age, ch. 7.
86 Martin, Anthem of Bugles, 33.
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use corporal punishment: ‘He could cane a whole class of 35 boys
and have the strength to shout, ‘‘Next!’’ after caning the 35th’.87
Discipline was not simply about punishment. It also meant the
rigorous structuring of all the boys’ time. But particularly in the
51960s the line between discipline and punishment was narrowly
drawn. The boys used to refer to Griffin as Gatemi, a Kikuyu
diminution of the word ‘cut’, which denoted his supposed
effectiveness with the cane.88 Certainly this gave rise to
rumours about his background. The boys gossiped that he had
10been a ruthless hunter of Kikuyu during Mau Mau when he had
supposedly similarly been nicknamed ‘the knife’.89 Ken Loach
picked up on the boys’ stories when making the SCF film and
repeated the rumour that the school was run by a headmaster who
had ‘shot more people in the Mau Mau uprising than anyone
15else’.90 Beyond the more fanciful stories, though, there were
certainly concerns about the regulations, order and military
discipline imposed at the school. That relatively few Old
Starehians from the early 1960s attend alumni events might
well be due to their less appreciated experiences of the school.
20Certainly, there were criticisms at the time of ‘Griffin’s magic mix
of uniform, rules and cane’ which created what amounted to a
‘military establishment’ and visiting NGO staff could be taken
aback at the militarism of the school and Griffin’s own khaki
attire.91
25In later years Griffin became more comfortable about
sparing the rod. He maintained, however, that corporal
punishment was absolutely crucial to order more generally.
When unrest broke out across Kenya’s schools in 2001, he
regretted the banning of caning in schools which he felt
87 Kingala, Autobiography, 112.
88 Ibid., 106.
89 Dida Jallow-Kalake, ‘A Childhood Memoir’, Freedom Newspaper Online, 12 Mar.
2010, at5http://www.freedomnewspaper.com/Homepage/tabid/36/newsid367/50
21/mid/367/London-Letter-Ngugi-Wa-Thiongos-Dreams-in-a-Time-of-War/Defa
ult.aspx4(accessed 19 Jan. 2016). It is also possible that the term referred back to his
use of circumcision as a tool of rehabilitation at Wamumu.
90 Ken Loach in Anthony Hayward, Which Side Are You On? Ken Loach and His Films
(London, 2004), 120.
91 Starehe Boys’ Centre, Endeavour (1969), 56: SCF Archive, 60; Joseph Odindo,
‘Griffin’s Magic Mix of Uniform, Rules and Cane’, Daily Nation, 30 June 2005,1–4;
Martin, Anthem of Bugles, 194; ‘Educating Modern Kenyans’, 371; Philip Jackson
and Gordon McLeod, ‘Report of visit to East Africa’, 26 Sept. 1967: Oxfam MSS,
PRG/1/3/2.
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underlay the disturbances.92 In this sense, his approach echoed
the ‘festishization of order’ and stability articulated by Kenya’s
political leaders and which was used to discredit the opponents of
the state’s development policies and ‘to violate its citizens’ human
5rights’.93 This explains why Griffin and Starehe have been
presented as models of good educational practice in Kenya and
why Shaw’s dual role at the school and with the police was seen as
complementary. The Ministry of Education has been a persistent
admirer of Starehe’s disciplinary techniques and record and it
10frequently asked Griffin to reflect on his experiences to fellow
headmasters and educationalists.94 When, in 1982, civil
disturbances erupted throughout the capital, Starehe was
admired for its ability to prevent the protests spilling onto its
campus, an achievement many other schools could not claim.95
15Following the notorious rape of seventy-one schoolgirls by the
their fellow boarders at St Kizito’s school in 1991, as well as
other outbreaks of general indiscipline, Griffin was asked to
submit a full report to a specially commissioned presidential
committee on student unrest.96 So well received were his
20recommendations that Griffin went on to revise them into a
general set of guidelines on good practice that were published
in 1994 as School Mastery.97
But if Griffin’s approach to education was aligned with the
requirements of the new post-colonial state, then so too did his
25work at Starehe fit with the specifically Kenyan approach to
nation-building advocated by the moderate nationalists who
supported Kenyatta after 1963. ‘Harambee’, literally ‘all pull
together’ in Swahili, became the official motto of Kenya. It was
a phrase ideally suited to the new leaders of Kenya who eschewed
30the more redistributive elements of socialism as advocated in
92 Andrew Harding, ‘Kenyan School Spare the Rod’, BBC Online, 21 Aug. 2001,
at5http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hOjiamboi/world/africa/1502376.stm4(accessed 19
Jan. 2016).
93 Daniel Branch, Kenya: Between Hope and Despair, 1963–2011 (New Haven, Ct.,
2011), 18.
94 Griffin to Dr Towset, minister for education, 4 Nov 1978; Daniel Mbiti, Ministry
of Education, to Griffin, 25 Jan 1980: KNA, XJ/27/85; Griffin to National Committee
on Educational Objectives and Policies, 11 May 1976: KNA, NYS/1/286.
95 Starehe Management Council minutes, 1982, 11: KNA, XK/1/12.
96 G. W. Griffin, ‘Submission to the Presidential Commission on Student Unrest
and Indiscipline in Kenyan Secondary Schools’, 18 Aug 1991: SCF Archive, 857.
97 Geoffrey Griffin, School Mastery: Straight Talk About Boarding School Management
in Kenya (Nairobi, 1994).
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other parts of Africa and who looked instead to self-supporting
institutions that did not upset an otherwise pro-capitalist and pro-
western agenda. Starehe fitted well within this conceptual
framework, suggesting both a tradition of self-help that had
5marked the independent school movement in Kenya and a
means of securing western funds for social welfare programmes
that the new regime could ill afford. In effect harambee eased the
transition from colonialism to independence and enabled
institutions and individuals such as Starehe and Griffin to offer
10almost seamless continuities between the two.
This was a marriage of school and nationalist politics that had
to be navigated carefully. Griffin undoubtedly came under some
pressure after 1963 from those more radical voices that pushed for
the ‘Africanization’ of key positions in the new independent state.
15Griffin ran into trouble with Dick Oloo, the MP who also served
as the director of the National Council of Social Service and who
was well aware of the many worthy welfare services that would
welcome the injection of foreign capital that Griffin was able to
obtain for Starehe.98 But Griffin had the backing of Kenyatta who
20immediately made him the director of the National Youth
Scheme (hereafter NYS) in April 1964. The NYS was created
as an ‘army without guns’, a mechanism to channel Mau Mau
agression to more productive purposes and to instil discipline and
order into all of the nation’s youth for civilian purposes, as well as
25providing a release valve for any pent-up feelings of dissatisfaction
among former Mau Mau fighters.99 For Griffin, it gave him
regular access to Kenyatta, a crucial opportunity for face-to-
face interaction given the way in which the president conducted
politics and which resulted in the reward of an extra one month’s
30leave per year from his official post to allow Griffin to focus on
Starehe.100 Most important of all, Kenyatta appointed Waruhiu
Itote, better known as the famous Mau Mau forest fighter,
General China, to the NYS: he eventually became Griffin’s
deputy in 1970. China had been incarcerated with Kenyatta,
35and the two had become close comrades, with the future
98 Pierre Zumbach to Colin Thornley, Sept. 1970: SCF Archive, 60.
99 See various press cutting in KNA, NYS, for example: P. G. Okoth, ‘Experiment
which Grew into Major National Force’, The Standard, 17 Aug. 1974, 4; Ocobock, An
Uncertain Age, ch. 9.
100 ‘President proud of work done by NYS’, Daily Nation, 4 Nov. 1970: KNA,
NYS/1/251; Griffin, ‘Starehe: Planning for the Future’: KNA, XJ./27/85
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president teaching China to improve his English and his political
understanding. Initially uneasy alongside one another, Griffin
and China became great colleagues. China facilitated Griffin’s
direct access to the president on several occasions, as well as
5serving on the school management committee and providing a
genuine national hero to visit the boys at Starehe frequently over
the next three decades.101 Once enemies in combat, by 1974
China could speak of the ‘most steady, intelligent and wise
leadership’ of Griffin at the NYS.102
10Starehe fitted well with the type of nation-building that
Kenyatta advocated. As historians of modern Kenya have
argued, the real winners of Mau Mau were not the rebels but
the loyalists during the Emergency. They continued to staff the
institutions of state and Kenyatta’s dislike of radicalism meant
15that he was unwilling to embark on a massive process of
educational reform that would have threatened the status of
independent schools. For all its ‘rhetoric of non-alignment and
African socialism, Kenyatta’s government was generally pro-West
and pro-capitalism.’103 As Daniel Branch has argued, Kenyatta’s
20politics came to be based on identity and ‘recognition’ (that
is, of the rights of ethnic groups) rather than on the
‘redistribution’ that many of his more radical political
opponents pursued. They, unlike him, preferred policies of
greater state intervention and even the removal of white settlers
25from their lands. Charity and private initiative — the factors
behind Starehe’s growth — fitted seamlessly within the broader
political context of Kenyatta’s moderate nationalism and ethos of
stability and control.104
Griffin made the appropriate noises about ‘harambee’ and
30African socialism. Starehe, he claimed, was based upon
brotherhood and freedom, principles which did not, as his
critics contended, make Etonians out of the destitute, but
101 King’ala, Autobiography, 78–9; Anderson, Histories of the Hanged, 230–88;
Griffin, ‘Starehe: Planning for the Future’: KNA, XJ./27/85. On Itiote’s
relationship with Kenyatta and his role at the NYS see his autobiography, Mau Mau
General, reprinted in Myles Osborne (ed.), The Life and Times of General China: Mau
Mau and the End of Empire in Kenya (Princeton, NJ, 2015), 32, 120, 128–9,
102 Minutes of NYS staff meeting, 16 Aug. 1974, N.59/74: General China: KNA,
ARK/2/32.
103 Branch, Kenya, 38.
104 Burton and Jennings, ‘Introduction’, 10–12; M. Tamarkin, ‘The Roots of
Political Stability in Kenya’, African Affairs, lxxvii (1978).
31 of 41CHARITY, DECOLONIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT
[25.8.2016–9:22am] [1–42] Paper: OP-PAST160043
MANUSCRIPT CATEGORY: ARTICLE
which aligned the school with his ‘faith in the meritocratic
doctrine of African socialism’.105 As the new state struggled to
find the funds to support an educational infrastructure, locally
supported and community-funded harambee schools sprang up
5around the country to cater for the many children unable to find
places in government schools.106 Even by 1985, of the
approximately 2,000 secondary schools in the country, around
one-third were government maintained, one-third were
harambee and another third were originally harambee but
10received (like Starehe) government assistance for teacher
salaries.107 Gaps existed within social welfare and Griffin made
sure that he filled them in a manner compatible with the
governing principles of the day.
Likewise, he carefully navigated the institutions of both the
15late-colonial and early post-colonial regimes. Although he was
principally devoted to his school, he never took a salary for his
work as director and, in fact, even appears to have invested some
of his own inheritance. His working day was focused in the
mornings on his job as Colony Youth Organizer and then
20National Youth Leader. He returned in the afternoons, still in
uniform, to the school, to focus on Starehe affairs, always
staying long enough to participate in the lowering of the flag
ceremony at the end of each day. Between all of this he worked
in an honorary capacity as the Kenya administrator for SCF, with
25Shaw flexibly serving as his administrative assistant in all three
roles. Undoubtedly, this involved a considerable strain upon his
time, but it also meant that Starehe’s interests would be foremost
when he dealt with the potentially competing demands of
government and western charity. Moreover, his entire private
30life was given over to the school, raising questions about his
non-existent domestic life and even his sexuality (perhaps a
little too defensively his biographer devoted several pages to
affirming his heterosexuality, but no real evidence exists beyond
a potential Freudian slip when Griffin referred to Shaw as ‘Patrick
105 Martin, Anthem of Bugles, 206.
106 L. A. Kivuva, ‘Secondary Education Reform in Kenya: The Quest for Quality,
Relevance and Equity’, Comparative Education Review, xlviii (2004); E. J. Keller,
Education, Manpower and Development: The Impact of Educational Policy in Kenya
(Nairobi, 1980).
107 Ojiambo, ‘Educating modern Kenyans’, 257.
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Griffin’108). But the key point is that at all times and in all his roles
he was attuned to different political and institutional agendas and
was able to ensure that Starehe took full advantage of them.
The actual benefits that Starehe could derive from the blurring
5of Griffin’s private and public functions within Kenya might be
trivial in any one instance. Cumulatively, however, they could be
much more substantial. As with his role in the colonial
government, he could steer dignitaries along a course that
would be sure to pass Starehe.109 He carefully selected
10government officials to serve on his management committee.110
He might obtain, through Shaw, additional assistance from the
police in training the school band.111 Or he might use his
connections with other government departments to secure
better school trips for his boys.112 The United Nations Day
15Parade in 1966, which Griffin organised, offered a visual image
of the fuzziness that he deliberately fostered. The Starehe boys
marched alongside the scouts and the NYS conscripts, while the
school band played with the police.113 Inevitably, the dual roles
that he adopted began to attract their critics. Along with pressures
20for Africanization from MPs such as Oprong Oduya, questions
arose in parliament about whether Griffin was supporting his
school through the admission of children of the rich and
powerful.114 Always a lurking suspicion among the school’s
critics and those given to jealousy following their own failure to
25secure places for their sons, there has never been enough evidence
to make such accusations stick, not least because of Griffin’s
genuine commitment to helping the disadvantaged.115 But he
108 Joyce Nyairo, ‘The Half-Truths Biographers Tell’, Daily Nation, 27 June 2014,
at5http://mobile.nation.co.ke/lifestyle/The-half-truths-biographers-tell-STAREH
E-BOYS-GEOFFREY-GRIFFIN/-/1950774/2363804/-/format/xhtml/-/11wxcw1/-/
index.html4(accessed 19 Jan. 2016); King’ala, Autobiography, 83, 142–5; Griffin,
‘Urban Youth Centre’: Hake Papers, PP MS 46/4/84.
109 Griffin to Ministry of Education, 27 Feb. 1969, 19 Nov. 1970: KNA, XJ/27/85.
110 Griffin to J. W. Nguru, provincial higher education officer, 9 Apr. 1983: KNA,
XK/1/12.
111 Griffin to B. N. Hinga, commissioner of police, 12 May 1976: KNA,
NYS/1/330.
112 Griffin to V. A. Hall, commander, Kenya Navy, 3 Dec 1969: KNA, NYS/1/329.
113 ‘United Nations Day Parade’, 7 Oct 1966: KNA, NYS/1/271.
114 Griffin to Ministry of Co-operation and Social Services, 28 June 1969; W. F. N.
Kiarie to Griffin, 1 Aug.1972: KNA, XJ/27/85.
115 Kiare to Gituro, 26 Sept. 1970; Kiare to Griffin, 4 June 1970; Kiare to Griffin,
27 Oct 1970: KNA, XJ/27/85.
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was politically savvy enough to know just when it was important
to please his masters. Two alumni from the early decades
particularly stand out: Michael and Andrew Kenyatta,
respectively the grandson and nephew of the president.116
5The school clearly meant different things to different people,
though for all its boys stood in for the future of Kenya as a
whole. As much as Starehe became the beacon of hope for so
many western aid agencies, it also became a symbol of a model
for the development espoused by Kenyatta and his allies. Moboya,
10Kibaki, Moi and Itote would be joined as visitors to the school by a
whole host of prominent government officials. For instance,
Mbiyu Koinange, Kenyatta’s brother-in-law, minister of state
and son of the prominent Kikuyu chief, Koinange Wa Mbiyu,
even presented the boys with a live bull as a Christmas present
15following his visit.117 Starehe took in boys from other African
countries in an attempt to present the school as a symbol of
progress not just for a nation but for an entire continent.118 The
people that the schooldid not attractwere those associated with the
opposition leader Oginga Odinga, a former minister in Kenyatta’s
20government who quit in 1966 to form the Kenya People’s Union.
Odinga himself would be interviewed in Loach’s SCF film about
Starehe, along with younger radicals such as the writer Ngu˜gı˜ wa
Thiong’o and the academic historian, Ben Kantai. Odinga told
Loach that Kenyatta’s government had maintained ‘the status
25quo’ of the colonial regime and had merely enriched itself to take
the place of the old settler elite.119 Later, in a voice-over by either
Thiong’o or Kantai to a scene of the Starehe boys marching in their
band, the viewer is informed that ‘the Starehe system, the
elimination of Swahili on campus, the prohibition of African
30dress on campus, the rigidness of uniform, . . . does do a
disservice to the African students, . . . it does tend to rip and
disembowel Africanism from them’.120
116 ‘Starehe Boys Centre: Dormitory Accommodation Proposal’, 1972: SCF
Archive, 60.
117 Martin, Anthem of Bugles, 66.
118 Griffin to Ministry of Education, 31 Mar. 1977; N. Nganga to Gachathi, 22 Apr.
1977: KNA, XJ/27/85.
119 Executive Committee Minutes 276
th
meeting, E.4326: SCF Archive, 421;
‘Transcript of Save the Children Fund Film’, 9, 14 , and Kenneth Brown Baker
Baker to Irving Teitelbaum, 28 Oct. 1969: ibid. 43, file: Kestrel Films, 1969–70.
120 ‘Transcript of Save the Children Fund Film’, 6: SCF Archive, 43, file: Kestrel
Films, 1969–70.
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What is remarkable, though, are the relatively few criticisms
that have been made of the school. To be sure, as Kenyatta
clamped down on opposition voices, Griffin faced less
opposition, at least in public. But Griffin’s adept navigation
5through various competing interests and agendas also enabled
him to bring people round to his cause. Here he could be
almost duplicitous. Belying his close connections to the
Kenyatta elite, he presented himself to SCF, for instance, as
a victim of the regime. He insisted that he wished to leave his
10role as National Youth Leader to devote more time to SCF,
but that Kenyatta, followed by Moi, would not allow him to
do so.121 This may have been a dream for Griffin, but he was
nevertheless being disingenuous since he knew too well of the
damage to his salary and other entitlements as a civil servant
15that would be lost were he to switch employment to a foreign
agent.122 ‘Obliged’ to carry on in only an honorary capacity,
assisted by his able deputy, Pat Shaw, Griffin then worked to
oppose other schemes that might deflect funding from
Starehe. He blocked funding for a Home for Destitute Girls
20in the Pumwami district of Nairobi that a SCF Council
member visited and wished to support, and he persistently
reined in SCF’s activities even when headquarters made it
clear that it wished to expand its work in the country.123
Instead, he managed to place ever more of his Starehe staff
25on the SCF payroll, making it liable for certain employer
responsibities.124
One area where he did face sustained criticism was in regard to
gender. He argued, and he dug his heels in, over the development
of a Starehe for girls in the 1970s, despite female education
30becoming recognised at this time as a vital tool for development
and notwithstanding repeated prompting from visiting NGO staff
and figures as prominent as Moi.125 Griffin did his duty and
participated in the wide-ranging interministerial committee to
look into a Starehe Girls’ Centre that the president instigated in
121 J. A. Cumber, ‘SCF Kenya’, 17 Nov. 1973: SCF Archive, 147.
122 J. S. Gichuru to J. G. Francis, 11 July 1963: KNA, A2G1/7/82.
123 Annexure ‘A’ to ORW Agenda, Mar. 1971: SCF Archive, 147.
124 J. P. Fonseca to Griffin, 13 June 1977: ibid.
125 Griffin to Fonseca, 15 May 1976: ibid.; address by Daniel arap Moi on the
occasion of the 20
th
Anniversary celebrations of the Starehe Boys Centre and
School, 5 Oct 1979: KNA, XJ/27/85; ‘Girls Starehe’, Weekly Review, 12 Oct. 1979,
13: KNA, XK/1/12.
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1980.126 But he will have been privately relieved when the
proposals became overshadowed and then forgotten by the
president amidst the unsettling of the regime in the run up to
the attempted coup d’e´tat in 1982. Griffin’s excuse was always
5that he simply did not have enough time and that the
promotion of girls’ education lay properly with women’s welfare
organizations.127 In this regard it is telling that the Starehe Girls
School did not open its doors until as late as 2005, the year of
Griffin’s death.128 But for others too, Griffin’s single-minded
10focus on his boys was a problem. By the later 1970s, senior staff
at SCF were becoming frustrated with Griffin’s Starehe-centric
approach to development yet he continued successfully to divert
their attempts to give him a salary, an initiative which might
reasonably have led to more being expected of him as their
15administrator.129 SCF also began to express ‘disquiet’ over ‘Mr
Shaw’s place in certain types of police operation’ but even then
Griffin deflected their concerns and instead persuaded SCF to
increase Shaw’s salary.130 Griffin has been described as a genius
by many, but perhaps his ultimate achievement was his ability to
20avoid sustained criticisms of any kind.
The final demonstration of this interplay between charity,
decolonization and development came in the support of the
Kenyan state for Griffin’s fund-raising schemes. Starehe held
the key to a world of international funding which the very
25highest officials of the Kenyan government were keen to access.
Kenyatta may have sniffed at ‘those professional friends of the
African’ but he was not averse to accepting their money.131
Whenever he and Moi spoke at Starehe events, they were
always sure to acknowledge the financial support received from
30the various agencies.132 This was part of a more general policy on
126 Report of the Interministerial Committee Appointed to Consider the Establishment of
Starehe Girls’ Centre, 1981: KNA, XK/1/12.
127 Griffin to Fonseca, 15 May 1976: SCF Archive, 147.
128 Even here, Griffin’s dubious diplomacy is apparent. In contrast to the evidence
presented here, the school’s website states that ‘The dream of starting Starehe Girls’
Centre was nursed for many years by the late Mr. Geoffrey Griffin, the founder of
Starehe Boys’ Centre, without success’, at5http://starehegirlscentre.co.ke/4.
129 Griffin to Fonseca, 17 June 1977: SCF Archive, 147.
130 N. P. Jackson, ‘Visit to SCF (Kenya)’, 19–23 May 1978; Hugh Mackay to
Griffin, 24 Aug. 1978; Griffin to Mackay, 9 Dec 1978: SCF Archive, 147.
131 Jomo Kenyatta, cited in Barnett, Empire of Humanity, 131.
132 Kenyatta, ‘Starehe Founders’ Day speech’, 30 May 1969; address by Daniel
arap Moi, 14 Nov. 1969; address by Daniel arap Moi, 1979: KNA, XJ/27/85.
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the part of the moderate nationalists to court the West. Mboya
and Kariuki were both well known friends of the US and both
used their visits to that country to attract donations to Starehe.
Kariuki returned from one such trip as early as 1965 bearing a
5personal cheque for £50 that he had obtained from Louis
Stumberg, the Texan frozen foods entrepreneur.133
Griffin knew full well the implications of these donations. As he
expressed it to the Ministry of Education, ‘it may be felt that, in
view of the country’s developing state and budgetary problems,
10we should not lightly cast aside the present very substantial
income from private sources (much of which results in useful
foreign exchange)’.134 Yet what is even more remarkable is that
the state did not passively accept such props to its own limited
welfare policies. It also actively approached the international aid
15community on behalf of Starehe. The Ministry of Education
wrote directly to agencies such as NOVIB and Brot fu¨r die Welt
to support Griffin’s requests for assistance, explaining how
important Starehe was to its nation-state building.135 When the
potential for charitable assistance took on greater proportions,
20the state could mobilize its personnel in a manner similar to
how it might approach the official institutions of global
government. In 1972 Vice-President Mwai Kibaki, then also
the minister for finance and the patron of Starehe, addressed
the IUCW directly to support a substantial donation. As he
25explained, because of the ‘pressing problems on almost every
front’ that Kenya as a nation was facing, ‘we must look for
beneficiaries outside Kenya to assist with capital works’.136
For all of these reasons — financial, political, pedagogical,
personal, philosophical — the seemingly peculiar circumstances
30of Shaw’s appointment begin to make more sense. Griffin could
present a focus on discipline, order and service that seemed to
place in microcosm the political principles of the government and
in a manner which could be sold to the West. It also meant that
Shaw did not have to hide his activities with Special Branch from
35the school. What he achieved on the streets of Nairobi with youths
133 ‘American Gift for Boys Centre’, East African Standard, 6 Aug. 1965: KNA,
NYS/1/327.
134 Griffin, ‘Starehe: Planning for the Future’: KNA, XJ/27/85.
135 Gachathi to NOVIB, 4 Aug 1971; Griffin to Gachathi, 29 Dec.1972; Gachathi
to Bread for the World, 15 July 1971: ibid.
136 Mwai Kibaki to Pierre Zumback, 1 Mar. 1972: SCF Archive, 60.
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lost to the criminal world actually complemented the work of the
school with those boys young enough to have been saved from
such a career. Indeed, Shaw is said to have taken some of the boys
out with him on reconnaisance trips, utilizing the skills that
5Griffin had instilled in them through the scout troop. Even after
Shaw had been rumoured — along with China — to have been
involved in Kariuki’s assassination, he was still revered by the
boys.137 In an interview conducted with him in the school
magazine, Scan, he recounted his work as a police reservist
10when he first arrived in Kenya. The boys, for their part, joked
that they entered his office ‘gingerly’, grateful that they were able
to ‘escape’ to publish their interview.138 The boys obviously knew
and possibly even approved of his activities, and he was supported
in them by not only Griffin and — indirectly — the SCF, but also
15by the Kenyan government. Amidst the confusing years of
decolonization and independence, when all sorts of agencies
and institutions were jockeying for roles and authority, charity
also intervened to set down its own marker in a more general, if
locally complex, mixed economy of welfare and development.
20III
It is important to draw out that which is particular to Starehe and
that which has more general applicability. Certainly, the
specificities of Starehe are many and the whole philosophy of
the school appears as something of an anachronism. Griffin’s
25rhetoric located the school within Kenyatta’s notion of
harambee and even of African socialism more generally. Yet it
borrowed almost all of its traditions from what he considered to
be the hallmarks of the English public school to the extent that it
largely copied Harrow’s ‘School Song’. Griffin repeatedly told of
30his disgust at the atrocities committed during Mau Mau yet it was
the liberal imperial rehabilitative ethos implemented at Wamumu
that provided the immediate precursor to Starehe’s creation. He
played a delicate balancing act so that the school could appeal
alike to royalty such as Princess Anne and heroic freedom-fighters
35such as General China. He maintained a forceful emphasis on
137 Charles Hornsby, Kenya: A History since Independence (London, 2012), 282;
Koigi Wa Wamwere, I Refuse to Die: My Journey for Freedom (New York, 2002), 182;
Branch, Kenya, 116.
138 ‘Interview with Mr. Shaw’, SCAN, 54, 1979, 16–17: SCF Archive, 147.
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discipline to the extent that he meted out punishments himself
with a military efficiency. So familiar was the importance of order
and discipline to both elite, public school-educated backers in
Britain and a first generation of nation-builders in Kenya, that
5it no longer appears quite so remarkable that his deputy was a
sadistic voluntary police reservist who frequently operated
outside the law. That Shaw’s salary continued to be paid by
SCF was, perhaps, a little more surprising, but merely attests to
the compromises made and the blind eyes that had to be turned
10when charities involved themselves in specific acts of assistance.
But it is in the support that the school received that something
of a more general nature emerges. Griffin clearly took advantage
of his position as an official of a western charity, a civil servant in a
colonial and then post-colonial government and as a volunteer
15director of a school. He occupied a space in social welfare created
by the interlinked processes of decolonization, development and
the expansion of philanthropy across Africa. From there, he was
able to ensure that his school received a steady supply of
donations at the expense of other initiatives in Kenya. He was
20able to present Starehe as fitting the needs of Kenya’s new
rulers, assisted through the regular visits that he arranged for
the likes of China, Mboya, Kenyatta, Moi and Kibaki. The
school might well have been the product of a British regime,
but it thrived once the bureaucracy of the imperial state had
25withdrawn and it proved itself an attractive source of western
funds to a nationalist government too unwilling or too unable
to devote such resources to education or homeless youth itself.
This should not detract from the wider context within which
Starehe thrived. Charitable interventions enabled non-state
30actors to become key agents in developing social welfare models
for African post-colonial development. The question comes
down to whether the success of the school equates with the
success of development more generally. There is no denying
that Griffin was successful on his own terms, and it is obvious
35too that the various aid agencies and governments also regarded
Starehe as a success, not least because they continued to fund and
support it over several decades. But from a development
perspective, success is ultimately measured according to
different criteria. Starehe was initially championed as an
40instance of several NGOs’ pursuit of grassroots initiatives
which, by the 1970s, would be celebrated more widely as the
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‘alternative’ path to development. This was to be focused on
small-scale local initiatives which aimed to have as their
principal beneficiaries the most needy in society, such as the
boys taken in at Starehe. And, ultimately, success for these
5projects would come when they became either self-sustaining or
were replicated elsewhere with similar results.
Yet Starehe’s success in this regard has been dependent upon its
continued charitable status. Those who have given to the school
have had to keep on giving. Here Starehe becomes emblematic of
10some of the more general problems associated with charitable
interventions in development, especially at this moment of
decolonization. The alternative approach of the NGOs was
never systematically planned or coherently thought out. A story
of success has been presented here, but it could so easily have
15been one of failure, as in the case of Oxfam and Christian Aid’s
adventures with ujamaa in Tanzania, one of the few examples of
the history of charity and development that has been
comprehensively covered.139 All these experiments in
alternative development initiatives involved complications,
20contradictions and complexities that have proved the chief
stumbling blocks whenever an NGO has sought to scale up the
benefits of a Starehe or any other scheme to a more general level.
And particularly in the 1960s, when methods of project
evaluation were, at best, rudimentary or else, more commonly,
25non-existent, so many charities entered late-colonial and post-
colonial Africa with limited experience and little knowledge of
where and what they were doing. Always attuned to what could
be sold to their publics at home, NGOs frequently fell under the
spell of a social entrepreneur such as Griffin or other well-
30connected persons who offered an opportunity to do good in a
fast and efficient manner. In doing so, they rushed headlong into a
gap in the provision of social and economic welfare that so many
individuals and institutions had an interest in them filling.
The fact that police officers, royalty, sports stars, celebrities and
35politicians could all come together to support an initiative shows
that they were all involved in a wider game of development about
which the rules and the expected outcomes were only vaguely
understood. That this all happened in the period from the late
139 Michael Jennings, Surrogates of the State: NGOs, Development and Ujamaa in
Tanzania (Bloomfield, Ct., 2008).
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1950s to the early 1970s, before the NGO approach to
development really took off as a global phenomenon, points to
the essentially messy and uncoordinated nature of decolonization
and development. Yet it set in motion many of the dynamics
5between the donating public, the sponsoring agency, the local
beneficiary and the fledgling state that would come to be
solidified in the latter decades of the twentieth century.
Undoubtedly, what it did was to carve out a role for charitable
agencies in the developing world that is now no longer
10questioned, no matter how diverse and effective such
interventions have proved to be. The end result of the NGO
intervention in the fledgling Starehe enterprise in 1959, as with
so many other development schemes, was that charity would
come to be a persistent presence over the next half century and
15more.
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